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JUDGING NAFTA
Gary Hufbauer*
Jacqueline McFadyen
L MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN NORTH AMERICA
The macroeconomic record is well-known, at least to a North Amer-
ican audience, and it would be tiresome to dwell on this part of the
NAFTA story. Let a few comments suffice. Our macroeconomic suc-
cesses and failures have practically nothing to do with the Canada/U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) or NAFTA. For a decade now, Canada
and the United States have followed a hard path of fiscal discipline and
monetary restraint. The politics were bloody; the economic rewards de-
layed. But since 1993, both countries have enjoyed not only good
growth - especially considering the low U.S. savings rate, and rigidities
in the Canadian labor market - but also very low inflation and falling
unemployment rates (Tables 1 and 2).'
Mexico is another story. The absence of fiscal discipline, statistically
concealed in the public accounts, falling private savings, and an increas-
ingly overvalued currency all culminated in the peso crisis of 1994
(Tables 1, 2, and 3). Mexican GDP fell sharply in 1995, the peso
plunged in real as well as nominal terms, and unemployment soared.
The NAFTA was not responsible for the crisis, but it did facilitate
the recovery. First, because the United States had invested a huge
amount of political capital in NAFTA, the Clinton Administration boldly
rode to the financial rescue. Despite a chorus of NAFTA-naysayers, this
was the right thing to do, and the U.S. Treasury loans were all re-paid
with a profit, ahead of schedule, early in 1997.
Second, because of the new-found flexibility in the Mexican econo-
my, and Mexico's commitments under NAFTA, President Ernesto
Zedillo succeeded with a highly orthodox recovery program: fiscal disci-
pline, ultra-tight money, and severe exchange rate devaluation. The pain
. Gary Hufbauer is the Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Eco-
nomics in Washifigton, D.C.
' The tables referred to in this Article can be found in the Appendix, located on page.
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in Mexico was exceedingly sharp, but the recovery time was brief, espe-
cially compared to the prolonged 1982-86 crisis. Already in 1996, the
Mexican GDP grew by 4.4% in real terms (Table 1), and the outlook
suggests growth of about five percent in 1997.
Over the longer term, the biggest challenge facing Mexico is to raise
private savings. Mexico needs to grow at five to seven percent annually
to attain a decent standard of living within a generation and to narrow
the income gap with Canada and the United States. Without sharply
higher private savings, sustained growth of five to seven percent will
not be achieved. The recipe for raising private savings is easy to state
and hard to implement: put social security on an accrual basis (not pay-
as-you-go), and to a large extent privatize the program; and shift the tax
system towards consumption taxes rather than income taxes.
11. U.S.-MEXICO MERCHANDISE TRADE
In each year since 1990, except the crisis year of 1995, U.S. mer-
chandise exports to Mexico have grown substantially faster than U.S.
merchandise exports to the rest of the world (ROW) outside North
America (Table 4). Largely this reflects import liberalization by Mexico,
launched by President Miguel de la Madrid (unilateral liberalization and
accession to GATT) and continued by President Carlos Salinas
("Mexico's Nixon," the sponsor of NAFTA). In historical perspective,
NAFIA should be seen as a step in Mexico's evolution from an in-
ward-looking state-directed economy, just as closed as Poland and Ro-
mania were in 1980, to an outward-looking, private-sector economy.
U.S. merchandise imports from Mexico have also grown substantial-
ly faster than U.S. merchandise imports from the rest of the world (Ta-
ble 4). Mainly this reflects the pressure of competition on Mexican
firms. Beginning with President de la Madrid, they could no longer
count on a protected and cartelized domestic market, and once NAFTA
was ratified, the old days were gone forever. Many Mexican firms hus-
tled and started selling into the giant U.S. market.
Fast-growing U.S. imports also reflect Mexico's vastly improved
climate as a place for foreign finms to build plants and export to the
United States. To a very small extent, fast-growing U.S. imports reflect
U.S. tariff cuts under the NAFTA. Average U.S. tariffs on Mexican
goods were already quite low in 1992 (under four percent), and since
NAFTA implementation began in January 1994, have been cut by less
than two percentage points.
[Vol. 23:11 1997
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II. U.S.-MExco SERVICES TRADE
The remarkable feature about two-way services trade (imports and
exports, including investment income) is that growth between the United
States and Mexico has actually been slower than growth between the
United States and the rest of the world (Table 5). This is something of
a mystery. Informed observers think a lot of business services trade is
missing in the statistics. The numbers could also reflect apprehension on
the part of Americans about vacationing in Mexico, and tight Mexican
budgets for vacationing in the United States. Whatever the explanation,
the NAFTA chapters which liberalize services trade - ranging from
insurance to telecommunications to parcel delivery - so far have had
little impact on the measured flows in either direction.
IV. U.S.-CANADA MERCHANDISE AND SERviCES TRADE
NAFTA, of course, is an extension of the FrA. The FTA entered
into force in 1989, and set the United States and Canada on a course of
substantially free trade (agriculture excepted) within ten years. NAFTA
enlarged and accelerated the free trade agenda between the United States
and Canada, but only in small ways.
Between 1990 and 1996, U.S. merchandise exports-to Canada grew
by sixty percent, while U.S. exports to ROW grew by fifty-four percent
(Table 6). Over the same period, U.S. imports from Canada grew by
seventy-one percent, while U.S. imports from ROW grew by fifty per-
cent. Together, the FrA and NAFTA clearly boosted U.S. exports to
Canada, and Canadian exports to the United States. But the main story
to emerge from these figures is that liberalization of the Canadian econ-
omy, coupled with fiscal and monetary discipline, and a substantially
more competitive Canadian dollar (Table 3), both pressured Canadian
firms to look south for market expansion and assisted them in doing so.
Industry-by-industry analysis, carried out by Daniel Schwanen more
clearly shows the impact of the FrA and NAFTA: Canadian exports to
the United States in sectors that were liberalized grew substantially
faster than Canadian exports in sectors that were not affected by the
trade agreements.2 As with Mexico, the overall U.S.-Canada services
trade seems to have underperformed ROW norms (Table 7). The FTA
pioneered the liberalization of commercial services, and served as a
2 See Daniel Schwanen, Trading Up: The Impact of Continental Integration on Trade, In-
vestment, and Jobs in Canada, C.D. HowE INSTITTrE COMMENTARY, No. 89 (Mar. 1997).
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model for the GATS agreement. Detailed analysis, in fact, shows that
two-way trade grew fastest in liberalized services.'
On the other hand, U.S. direct investment in Canada, and Canadian
direct investment in the United States, had already reached "mature"
levels by 1990. Two-way growth since 1990 has been slower than two-
way investment growth with the rest of the world, and thus investment
income (a big component of overall services trade) expanded rather
slowly.
V. CANADA-MEXICO MERCHANDISE AND SERVICE TRADE
Canada-Mexico two-way merchandise trade has expanded at spectac-
ular rates, albeit from a very low base (Table 8). Most of the expansion
should be attributed to a "getting to know you" phenomenon, associated
with the negotiation of NAFTA, rather than actual tariff cuts and quota
liberalization. Recall that, in Canada and Mexico, the business communi-
ty provided the driving force behind the FTA and NAFTA. Out of this
effort, a great many contacts were made that led to expanded business
opportunities.
The sparse statistical record on two-way services trade (Table 9)
likewise suggests that mutual discovery has been at work.
VI. IMPACT ON THIRD COUNTRmiEs
Countries that do not belong to the NAFTA are naturally concerned
about adverse effects on their exports to North America, particularly
their exports to the United States. Certainly there are grounds for con-
cern. Everyone knows the familiar danger of trade diversion associated
with every free trade area and customs union. More specific to NAFTA,
its very restrictive rules of origin - especially on textiles and apparel,
and on automobiles and parts - may cut out third country suppliers.
When a manufactured item shipped between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States runs the risk of losing NAFTA benefits, because its for-
eign content is just a bit too large, the producer will think twice about
buying a foreign component. However large or small this potential im-
pact may be, non-members have a legitimate interest in seeking less
restrictive NAFTA rules of origin.
That said, it is not apparent that NAFTA has impacted third country
suppliers. A gravity model of bilateral trade flows (imports plus ex-
(Vol. 23:11 1997
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ports), designed by Jeffrey Frankel, was used to examine the effects of
trading blocs and other variables in 1995.' The coefficient for trading
blocs was not statistically significant, but its value suggests that two-way
trade between bloc members was perhaps nineteen percent larger than
between non-bloc members, holding other characteristics constant The
structure of the model does not reveal whether larger two-way trade
comes at the expense of non-bloc members.
Another way of looking at the trade diversion question is to com-
pare U.S. merchandise import growth from Mexico between 1993 and
1996 with U.S. import growth from selected countries that might be
competitors, at least for certain products. Here are the figures:6
Mexico 83%
China 63%
Korea 33%
Taiwan 19%
Argentina 88%
Brazil 17%
Colombia 29%
From this simple-minded comparison, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that Mexico has sold significantly better in the U.S. market than other
countries with similar characteristics. Of course there are many "special"
reasons besides NAFTA - notably the severe Mexican recession. But,
after everything is sorted out, Mexican imports probably benefit from a
NAFTA advantage in the U.S. market. In our opinion, the NAF1A
advantage does not come at the expense of third country suppliers; but
it does indicate the trade growth that might be possible if tariff and
nontariff barriers were eliminated on a global basis.
VII. TRADE DISPUTES
More trade inevitably means more trade disputes, and NAFrA is no
exception. In fact, trade disputes that come to an agreed, if not amica-
ble, conclusion, and that establish the rules of the road for future com-
4 See JEFFREY FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM, In-
stitute for International Economics (forthcoming 1997).
5 See GARY C. HUFBAUER, Er AL, U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THEIR IMPACT ON TRADE,
JOBS, AND WAGES, Institute for International Economics (1997).
6 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Commerce News:
U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, 1993-96.
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merce, can be very healthy.
Tables 18 and 19 list trade disputes handled under Chapters 19 and
20 of the NAFTA agreement. Chapter 19 deals with anti-dumping and
countervailing duty complaints (there have been thirty-one since NAFTA
entered into force); Chapter 20 addresses interpretations of the agreement
itself (two disputes). Most of these thirty-three disputes have been re-
solved on a "technical track," without resorting to political negotiations
(softwood lumber with Canada, and tomatoes with Mexico are excep-
tions). In addition to the formal disputes, there are two or three major
"informal" disputes underway: a package of trucking issues, which look
close to resolution; the Helms-Burton law, which will endure as long as
Fidel Castro runs Cuba; and the U.S. ban on Mexican avacados, which
remains in place for a combination of economic and phyto-sanitary
reasons.
The NAFTA dispute mechanisms have practically eclipsed the WTO
mechanisms as a forum for Canada, Mexico, and the United States to
settle their formal trade disputes. Since 1995, only two disputes among
the parties have been taken to the WTO (Table 20). This alone testifies
to the sound architecture of the NAFTA structure. As for "informal"
disputes, which are often politically charged, they are handled in the
customary way: diplomats talking to diplomats.
VIII. DISPLACED AMERICAN WORKERS
The battle cry in the NAFTA ratification debate was jobs. "NAFTA
will suck millions of jobs from American workers!" "NAFTA will create
hundreds of thousands of new jobs!" These were the soundbites that
defined the debate. Like many soundbites, they misstated the issue.
In a free market economy with a flexible labor force, the level of
employment is little affected by trade agreements (such as NAFTA), by
defense plant closures, by oil booms, by crop failures, or by any num-
ber of other microeconomic events. These microeconomic calamities or
bonanzas may affect the composition of jobs and the fortunes of particu-
lar states and cities. But the overall level of employment is determined
by the central bank (in the United States, the Federal Reserve).
In its wisdom, the central bank adjusts monetary tightness to head
off inflation and, in the same breath, sets the overall tone of labor mar-
kets. If a particular microeconomic event creates or destroys jobs in an
industry or locality, the effects at the national level will be washed out
by monetary policy. If the sum of microeconomic episodes in the econo-
my creates too much employment, and thereby stirs inflationary embers,
the central bank will step on the monetary brake; if the sum of microec-
[Vol. 23:11 1997
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onomic episodes creates too little employment, and inflation is accept-
ably low, the central bank will step on the monetary gas.
Hence it makes no sense to talk about jobs "created" or "destroyed"
by NAFTA, when those words are used to mean a permanent net
change in the level of employment. NAFTA will affect the composition
of employment - it will cause some industries to expand and others to
contract. But it will not cause American (or Mexican, or Canadian)
employment overall to be appreciably higher or lower than the central
bank deems appropriate.
With that overriding qualification, we can talk sensibly about jobs
affected by NAFTA. This discussion is confined to the United States,
both for reasons of space and because the jobs/NAFTA equation has not
dominated public debate in Canada and Mexico to nearly the same
extent as in the United States. (Most Mexicans realize that macroeco-
nomic blunders explain their woes; most Canadians understand that
Canada must trade to prosper.)
One way to talk about U.S. jobs affected by the FTA and NAFTA
is to ask what difference these agreements have made to U.S. exports
and imports, and then to calculate the number of jobs affected by the
change. Determining the impact of NAFTA on trade flows is not easy,
because many other events are happening at the same time - for exam-
ple, a financial crisis in Mexico and a more competitive Canadian dol-
lar. Various econometric techniques, such as computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) models, can be brought to the task. Here we offer a simple
and exaggerated calculation. We attribute to NAFTA all the difference,
since 1990, between U.S. merchandise trade growth with Mexico and
Canada by comparison with U.S. trade growth with the rest of the
world. Then we multiply each one billion dollars of additional U.S.
trade (imports or exports) by 13,200 jobs, a coefficient that applies to
manufactured goods trade in 1996 (including ancillary suppliers). Here
are the results of this simple and exaggerated arithmetic:
* In 1996, U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico were $17.8 billion larger
than they would have been if they had grown at the same rate as U.S.
exports to ROW between 1990 and 1996.
* The associated increase in jobs in U.S. export industries was 235,000
(17.8 times 13,200), or on average 39,000 per year.
* In 1996, U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico were $46.7 billion
larger than they would have been if they had grown at the same rate as
U.S. imports from ROW between 1990 and 1996.
* The associated decrease in jobs in U.S. import-competing industries
was 616,000 (46.7 times 13,200), or on average 103,000 per year.
How do these numbers stand up against well-known benchmarks?
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One benchmark is the total number of jobs created in the U.S. economy
since 1990. Total employment grew from 118.8 million to 126.7 million,
a total of 7.9 million jobs, or about 1.3 million jobs annually. This
figure, which reflects the robust U.S. macroeconomic climate since 1992,
totally dominates the annual calculation of 39,000 more export jobs, and
103,000 fewer import-competing jobs possibly attributable to the' FTA
and NAFTA.
Another benchmark is the number of workers certified for NAFTA
Transitional Adjustment Assistance, because their jobs were abolished by
firms that moved to Mexico or Canada, or by firms that lost sales to
Mexican or Canadian imports. As of early 1997, that figure was a total
of 117,000 workers (cumulative since January 1994), or an average of
about 39,000 per year (Table 10). Not surprisingly, most of the NAFTA
certified workers were affected by trade with Mexico, not Canada.
The figure of 39,000 NAFTA certified workers per year is clearly
less than the calculation of import-competing jobs affected by FTA and
NAFTA (103,000 per year). The main reason is that most "affected"
workers either stayed in the same job (because their firms shifted sales
to other markets), or quickly found work elsewhere in the robust U.S.
economy. In fact, out of the 103,000 certified workers, fewer than
10,000 have actually made use of NAFTA Transitional Assistance. This
surprisingly low figure is largely explained by the dual qualification of
displaced workers both for regular Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)
and NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance, and their choice of
more flexible TAA benefits.
A third benchmark is the total number of jobs displaced annually in
the U.S. economy, owing to plant closings, slack demand, or abolished
positions. That figure is about 1.5 million annually (Table 11). In the
dynamic U.S. economy, with constant change in every nook of the labor
market, total displacements dwarf the possible decrease in import-com-
peting jobs attributable to the FTA and NAFrA.
Indeed, the fact that the U.S. economy generated an additional 1.3
million jobs annually, while displacing 1.5 million jobs, implies that
about 2.8 million gross new jobs are created each year. If we did not
have flexible labor practices that enable firms to close down, lay off
redundant workers, and abolish positions, it is most unlikely that the
U.S. economy would generate anywhere near 1.3 million additional jobs
each year. For proof, look at Germany and France, which have gener-
ated no new jobs since 1990.
[Vol. 23:11 1997
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IX. IMPACr ON WAGES
A common view of NAFrA, widely held in the United States, is
that free trade with Mexico depresses the wages of U.S. unskilled work-
ers. NAFTA opponents, when pressed, will usually concede that NAFTA
itself is a stalking horse for trade with poor countries worldwide -
Brazil, China, India, and many others. Hence the wages debate quickly
spills out of the NAFrA context into an argument about the pros and
cons of global free trade.
On this question, the economics profession has written a shelf of
books and articles. For those who do not have time to read the whole
shelf, the best survey is given by William Cline.7 A snapshot of the
survey is that, at most, freer trade may be responsible for thirty percent
of the increase in the differential between skilled and unskilled wages
over the past two decades. More likely, freer trade is responsible for
about ten percent of the widening differential, and other factors - tech-
nology especially, but also the changing composition of demand towards
less labor-intensive products, the declining role of unions in America,
the high level of illegal immigration - account for ninety percent of
the widening differential.
Returning to U.S. trade with Mexico, two statistics are illuminating.
The first is that the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.32 be-
tween two-digit U.S. industries that experienced rapid import growth
from Mexico and rapid export growth to Mexico since 1993. Since the
value of the statistic can range from -1.00 to 1.00, a value of 0.32
means that in many cases industries enjoyed both rapid import growth
and rapid export growth. To economists, intra-industry trade expansion
is a familiar consequence of free trade pacts. To most Americans, it is
something of a surprise. What intra-industry trade growth means, in
practical terms, is a sorting out of firms within an industry, on both
sides of the border, according to their competitive strengths. Hence,
workers who lose their jobs can often find new employment in another
firm in the same industry.
The other statistic deserving emphasis is the wage premium paid by
the U.S. export sector. Premium export wages reflect the lessons of
comparative advantage - at the most practical level. Analysis done by
the Department of Commerce' and Richard and Rindal9 confirms that
SWILLIAM CLuNE, TRADE, JOBS, AND INCOME DISTIBTmON, Institute for International Eco-
nomics, 1997.
' See U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (Aug. 1995, Sept. 1996,
Nov. 1996).
9 See J.D. RICHARD & K. RINDAL, WHY EXPORTS REALLY MATrER: WHY EXPORTS MAT-
9
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workers directly and indirectly employed in the export sector earned
twelve to fifteen percent higher wages. Taking the lower figure (which
applies to combined direct and indirect employment), the export wage
premium is about $4,400 per worker in 1997. This is not bad, especially
for workers who owe their jobs to expanding trade with Mexico and
Canada.
More revealing than the statistics was Helene Cooper's account of
Nogales, Arizona. Since NAFTA, home construction has boomed and
forty-six new plants have opened. But the labor demand is for skilled
workers, and these have largely been attracted from the North and the
Midwest. While manufacturing employment is up nearly six percent in
Nogales, unskilled local workers confront a twenty-two percent unem-
ployment rate.10
X. FOREIGN DIREcT INVESTMENT
Like services trade, foreign direct investment within North America
is somewhat puzzling. Again, it is a story of the "dog that didn't bark."
Canada and Mexico have not sent very much foreign direct investment
into the United States (Table 12). At the same time, since 1990, U.S.
foreign direct investment in Canada has increased only marginally faster
than investment in Canada from all countries (Table 13). Finally, the
"great sucking sound" remains to be heard. U.S. and Canadian foreign
direct investment flows into Mexico are a trivial portion of plant and
equipment expenditures at home (much less than one percent annually).
Since NAFTA entered into force, direct investment by U.S. and Canadi-
an firms in Mexico has averaged less than four billion dollars annually
(Table 14).
XI. ILLEGAL DRUGS
NAFrA, as a trade agreement, has nothing to do with illegal drugs.
The sensitive issues of narco-cooperation between U.S. and Mexican
forces, extradition of drug lords, and rampant corruption inspired by
drug money are dealt with - effectively or otherwise - by different
officials and different agreements.
But NAFTA as a political concept has everything to do with illegal
TER MORE! Institute for International Economics, 1995.
"0 See Helene Cooper, Labor Mismatch: Nogales, Ariz., Throws A Post-Nafta Party, But
Locals Miss Out, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1997, at Al.
[Vol. 23:11 1997
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drugs. If Mexico collapses into chaotic violence, a major explanation
will be drug money spent to corrupt Mexican institutions top to bottom.
Couple this with the violence brought on by wars between shifting
alliances of rival drug lords, disaffected guerillas, federal and state po-
lice, and military forces. And if Mexico collapses into chaotic violence,
NAFTA will be deemed a political failure, whatever its achievements as
a trade agreement.
The statistical story is told in Tables 15 and 16. Mexican cultivation
of cannabis has dropped significantly since 1991, while cultivation of
opium (poppies) is up sharply. Mexican eradication achievements are
about the same now as they were five years ago. There are year-to-year
fluctuations, but there is no trend. Meanwhile, seizures of cannabis with-
in Mexico and at the border have dramatically increased, but seizures of
cocaine within Mexico have fallen, while border seizures are about the
same. What is going on, of course, is that far more cocaine is being
shipped from Colombia, and corruption within Mexico is taking a severe
toll on capture rates.
As this drama unfolds, the United States at least ought to recognize
the consequences of its own policies. The story is told by a Task Force
of the Council on Foreign Relations." The vast U.S. market for illegal
drugs, coupled with U.S. policies of criminalization and interdiction,
have ensured high drug prices. High drug prices deliver hundreds of
billions of dollars annually to drug cartels. The climate and rugged
terrain in southern Mexico make ideal conditions for growing cannabis
and poppies. No legitimate agriculture comes close to the cash return on
narco-crops. Meanwhile, the long U.S.-Mexico land border, the huge
expanse of ocean in the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic, and the vast
reaches of airspace, all invite ingenious forms of smuggling.
The cartels have responded to U.S. pressure on Colombia both by
shifting their transit operations to Mexico and by spending hundreds of
millions of dollars corrupting Mexican politicians, judges, police, and
military officers. And, as the United States recruits ordinary officials and
elite forces to fight the drug war, it enlarges the targets of corruption
and violence. Eventually, U.S. policies may prevail. Since 1981, the
United States has spent $25 billion on foreign interdiction and source
country programs. So far, the bad guys are winning, while fragile societ-
ies, such as Mexico, are losing.'"
" See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, 1997.
,2 See David Johnston & Sam H. Verhovek, Drug Trade Feeds on Payoffs at Mexico Line,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at Al.
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XII. ILLEGAL MIGRATION
As with illegal drugs, the NAFTA trade agreements have nothing to
do with illegal migration, and very little to do with legal migration
(some enlargement of business and professional visas). But again, as a
political concept, NAFTA has everything to do with illegal migration.
President Carlos Salinas asked rhetorically, "Do you want our tomatoes
or our tomato pickers?" The answer, of course, is that the United States
will get both for a very long period of time. Apprehensions, in fact, are
up since 1992, and the annual figure is now about 1.6 million (Table
17). A rule of thumb is that every apprehension corresponds to one
immigrant who gains entry to the United States. Many stay for only a
few months before returning to Mexico; others settle down in the United
States, mainly in California, New York, Texas, Illinois, Florida, and
New Jersey. The total number of illegal residents is probably about five
million persons, about one-third are from Mexico.
Over the long haul, if NAFTA is coupled with continued Mexican
economic and social reforms, and much higher Mexican savings rates,
migration pressures will decrease. Evidence from Europe suggests that
migration falls sharply when the per capita income of the poorer country
reaches half the level of the richer country. With twenty or thirty years
of very hard work, that is possible for Mexico. In the meantime, migra-
tion pressures will remain severe. Increased border surveillance, stepped
up deportation efforts, and stricter sanctions on employers may make
some difference. But enforcement measures will have human costs, and
take a toll on U.S.-Mexico relations.
[Vol. 23:11 1997
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Table 2.
US and Canada:
Employment Statistics, 19901996
(in millions, percent)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
US employed 118.8 117.7 118.5 120.3 123.1 124.9 126.7
% change 1.2 -0.9 0.7 1.5 2.3 1.5 1.4
US unemployment rate 5.6 6.8 7.5 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.4
Canadian employed 13.2 12.9 12.8 13.0 13.3 13.5 13.7
% change 0.6 -2.3 -0.8 1.1; 2.3 1.5 1.5
Canadian unemployment 8.1 10.4 11.3 11.2 10.4 9.5 9.7
Source: U.S. Deparment of Labor, Employment and Earnings, January. 1997;
Statistics Canada, Canadian Social Trends, December 1996;
Statistics Canada, The Labour Force, December 1996.
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Table 3.
Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices, 1990-1996
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996p
Canada 100.0 103.2 95.8 87.8 81.9 78.7 81.0
Mexico 100.0 111.6 121.5 130.4 126.4 88.0 99.3
United States 100.0 97.6 96.2 98.6 97.4 92.1 97.5
Source:IMF, International Financial Statistics, March 1997;
Mexico Statistics are from ECLAC, Preliminary Overview of the Economy of Latin America and
the Caribbean. 1996.
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Table 9.
Canada-Mexico Services Trade, 1992-1904
(in millions of Canadian dollars)
1902 1993 1994
Canadian Exports to Mexico as 59 73
% change from previous year 200.0 o14.5 23.7
Canadian Exports to the Rest of the World 3,161 3,707 4,09
% change from previous year 8.3 17.3 24.3
Canadian Imports from Mexico 40 42 61
% change from previous year 17,0 -8.7 45.2
Canadian Imports from the Rest of the World 4,738 4,108 5,347
6 change Prm prevlous year 4' 4. -13,3 30.2
Canadian Balance of Service Trade with Mexico 23 17 12
Note: Services Include both commercial sevicas (such as tourism and telecommunkation
and Investment Income (such as dividends and Interest).
Rest of the World equals total exporta and Imports outside of Naf
Source: Statetics Canada, Canoda's Intemational Transactions In SaMbee, 1994-1905.
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Table 10.
Workers Certified under the NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program
Canada Mexico Unidentified Total
1994 (I) 543 980 0 1,523
(11) 1,144 2,599 0 3,743
(111) 890 4,530 408 5,828
(IV) 4,162 4,232 1,257 9,651
1995 (I) 1,324 3,124 1,471 5,919
(11) 3,488 4,228 834 8,550
(111) 2,473 2,475 2,458 7,406
(IV) 3,497 6,564 1,557 11,618
1996 (I) 1,692 7,418 2,435 11,545
(11) 1,672 9,550 2,903 14,125
(111) 747 6,062 2,645 9,454
(IV) 941 8,407 757 10,105
1997 (I) 1,169 12,575 3,305 17,049
Total 23,742 72,744 20,030 116,516
Note: Assistance provided when Jobs lost either because of a shift In production to Canada/Mexico
or because of Increased imports from CanadaMexico (whether or not the Increase was attributable
to tariff cuts under NAFTA).
Source: US Department of Labor, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance database.
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Table 12.
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States,1990-1995
(in billions of US dollars; position at historical cost)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Canada
Position 29.5 36.8 37.8 40.5 42.1 46.0
Flows 1.8 0.1 1.3 3.8 4.0 4.5
Mexico
Position 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.1 2.3 2.0
Flows 0.2 0.2 0.7 -0.1 1.3 -0.5
All Countries
Position 395.0 419.1 427.6 466.7 502.4 560.1
Flows 48.4 22.8 18.9 43.5 49.9 60.8
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, September 1996;
1990 statistics are from Survey of Current Business, August 1995.
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Table 13.
Foreign Direct Investment In Canada, 1990-1995
(in billions of Canadian dollars; position at historical cost)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
United States
Position 84.4 87.0 89.1 91.6 101.5 113.1
Flows 3.2 2.0 2.7 5.3 7.3 10.2
Mexico
Position 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Flows n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
All Countries
Position 131.1 135.8 138.7 142.3 152.8 168.0
Flows 9.2 3.1 5.4 6.4 8.2 15.4
Source: Statistics Canada, Canada's International Investrnent Position, 1995.
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Table 14.
Foreign Direct Investment In Mexico, 1990-1995
(in billions of US dollars; position at historical cost)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
United States
Position 10.3 12.5 13.7 15.2 15.7 14.0
Flows 1.9 2.3 1.3 2.5 3.3 2.1
Canada
Position 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Flows 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
All Countries
Position n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Flows 2.6 4.8 4.4 4.4 11.0 7.0
Source:Unlted States: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, September 1996;
U.S. 1990 statistics are from Survey of Current Business, August 1995;
Canada: SECOFI, September 1996;
AJI Countries: Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy, 1996.
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Table 15.
Cultivation and Eradication of Cannabis and Opium in Mexico, 1991-1996
(in hectares)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Cannabis
Potentially harvestable
% change from previous year
17,915 16,420 11,220 10,550 6,900 6,500
-48.9 -8.3 -31.7 -8 -34.6 -5.8
Eradication 10.795 12,100 9,970 8,495 11,750 12,200
% change from previous year 59.9 12.1 -17.6 -14.8 38.3 3.8
Cultivation
% change from previous year
Opium
Potentially harvestable
% change from previous year
Eradication
% change from previous year
28,710 28,520 21,190 19,045 18,650 18,700
-31.3 -0.7 -25.7 -10.1 -2.1 0.3
3,765 3,310 3,960 5,795 5,050 5,100
-30.9 -12.1 19.6 46.3 -12.9 1
6,545 6,860 7,820 6,620 8,450 7,900
40.8 4.8 14 -15.3 27.6 -6.5
Cultivation 10,310 10,170 11,780 12,415 13,500 13,000
% change from previous year 2.1 -1.4 15.8 5.4 8.7 -3.7
Source: United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Intemational Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1997.
[Vol. 23:11 1997
28
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 23 [1997], Iss. , Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol23/iss/6
Hufbauer-JUDGING NAFTA
Table 16.
Seizures of Drugs and Drug Related Arrests In Mexico, 1991.1996
(in mt, usable plant yield .56mt/ha)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Seizures of Drugs
Heroin and Opium
In Mexico 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6
At Border* 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Cocaine
In Mexico 50.3 38.8 46.2 22.1 22.2 23.6
At Border 21.3 23.6 21.8 24.5 21.8 19.5
Cannabis
In Mexico 255 405 495 528 780 1,150
At Border 75 118 135 145 186 243
Drug Related Arrests
Total Arrests 8,762 27,577 17,626 7,006 9,901 11,247
% change from previous year -51.8 214.7 -36.1 -60.3 41.3 13.6
*Includes heroin only.
Source: In Mexico and Drug Related Arrests - United States Department of State, Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
March 1997. At Border- US Customs Service
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